ABSTRACT
The Horn of African politics has recently been subject to significant geopolitical changes. The trilateral summit that took place in early October this year sent shockwaves across the Horn of Africa and beyond, signaling a dramatic shift in regional alliances and the formation of a military-diplomatic block aimed at countering Ethiopian ambitions in the region. Ethiopia’s recent moves concerning the port deal struck with the unrecognized government of Somaliland, which had already warmed up the waters, which then heated up further with the Egyptian declaration of military assistance to Somalia. The escalation seems to have reached its boiling point at the level of alliances, as the heads of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia gathered last month in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, to discuss Ethiopia’s latest moves and their implications for regional security. This article outlines the events leading to the so-called “anti-Ethiopian axis” and the motives of each state to take part in the Asmara summit to shed light on the emerging balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopian Ambitions Perceived as Threats to its Neighbors
Ethiopia, landlocked after the loss of access to the Red Sea following the independence of Eritrea in 1991, has been under a constant quest to regain its supply for its soaring population [7] and booming economy [3]. For this reason, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abid Amed announced in January this year that his country had reached terms with the Somaliland government in acquiring the Somaliland port of Berbera together with a 20-kilometer-long coastline for a period of 50 years. [18] However, the “memorandum of understanding” between the two governments appears problematic at many levels. First, Somaliland is an internationally unrecognized entity generally considered a breakaway region of Somalia, which explains the Mogadishu government’s condemnation of the treaty as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. [8] Second, in practice, Ethiopian engagement with Somaliland grants diplomatic recognition to the latter, endangering Somalia and potentially encouraging its other semi-autonomous regions, such as the Puntland region [9], to push for greater autonomy or even a unilateral declaration of independence.
The Ethiopian move, targeting the Berbera Port, received a negative reaction from the wider international community. Upon announcing the deal, Turkey and Egypt condemned the treaty, stating its controversiality. [20] The European Union and African Union also expressed their concerns [20], assuming that it may deteriorate the regional security already shattered by the decades-long civil war in Somalia and the war against the Al-Shabab insurgency. Even China, Ethiopia’s major investment partner [1], voiced support for the position of Somalia in this regard. [39]
The diplomatic crack between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa deepened further when Somalia announced its decision to expel Ethiopian troops deployed within the territory unless the latter denounced the Somaliland deal by the end of this year. [27] The Ethiopian armed forces maintain 3.000 troops in Somalia under the African Union peacekeeping mission to fight against the radical Al-Shabab insurgency [27], while a bilateral agreement between the two countries allowed the deployment of an additional 5.000–7.000 Ethiopian units. [27] If undertaken, the expulsion of Ethiopian army units will have implications for global war efforts against Al-Shabab, possibly strengthening their grip on the southern territories of the country. [23] The implementation of the expulsion decision by the Somali authorities and the effectiveness of Somali law enforcement forces to swiftly carry out the process, avoiding further escalation, also raise concerns. Rifts between the two countries keep occurring, with the most recent one lying in Somalia having declared an Ethiopian counselor “persona non grata,” effectively giving him 72 hours to leave the country. [30] The restrained diplomatic relations between the two sides alarm for the potential cut of ties in the near future and a subsequent military buildup by both.
Complications for Military Assistance to Somalia
The announcement of the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal sent shockwaves to Mogadishu, signaling the urgent need to better organize its military aimed at discouraging external interference and keeping its “unloyal” autonomous region under control. The Somali National Army had been in a state of disarray since the outbreak of the First Somali Civil War in the late 1980s [38] until the early 2000s, when the country received foreign assistance, notably from the US, the UN, and the African Union (AU), to fight the radical Al-Shabab insurgency.
Somali army units have been given considerable material and training support over the years, resulting in the establishment of new ties with third parties in defense matters. [38] Turkey, among Somalia’s greatest military suppliers [11], has stepped up cooperation with the country in recent months. In February, following the Somaliland port deal, a defense agreement with Turkey, particularly concerned with maritime security, was approved [10], authorizing Ankara to train and equip Somalia’s allegedly nonfunctional naval forces. The aim is to defend Somalia’s territorial waters from activities such as illegal fishing, piracy, terrorism, and threats from abroad, with the latter clearly referring to the Somaliland port deal and the Berbera port, which is leased to Ethiopia for military purposes. Apart from deterring Ethiopian moves, the Ankara-Mogadishu maritime defense deal manifests the capability of Somalia to gain international support in defending its territorial integrity.
In addition, Somalia reaches regional powers like Egypt, which shares its concerns over expansionist Ethiopian policies in the Horn region, and the robust defense cooperation between the two countries is often radically pronounced. In early September, Egypt reportedly sent nearly 10.000 troops [14] to Somalia under a peacekeeping mission declared by a security pact. [43] The latter also includes the shipment of an array of military hardware, such as armored vehicles, rocket launchers, artillery, anti-tank missiles, radars, and drones. [29] Joint military drills involving elements of land, air, and naval forces of Somalia and their Egyptian counterparts were also announced in September as an extension of the pact. [28] However, the implications render a higher escalation, as Ethiopia sees the deployment of Egyptian army units along its southern frontiers as a national security threat owing to the year-long dispute over the distribution and usage of Nile waters, with negotiations currently deadlocked. [32]
Egyptian army deployment might pave the way for armed confrontations with the Ethiopian forces in Somalia, especially under the wrapping of the current AU peacekeeping mission at the end of 2024. [24] Major concerns arise from Ethiopia’s unwillingness to pull out its forces right after the expiration of the AU peacekeeping mission, and a potential joint Somali-Egyptian action to forcefully remove Ethiopian troops from Somalia. However, the situation in Somalia does not prompt the escalation of the Mogadishu-Cairo side, with the fragmented security apparatus of the Somali state currently incapable of posing major challenges for Ethiopian units operating within the country. Egypt, too, is not apt to increase its military commitment because of the logistical difficulties in supplying to Somalia. In the absence of Ethiopia’s reference to the recent Al-Shabab gains or the threatening Egyptian military presence, one could anticipate a gradual removal of its troops from Somalia, which does not necessarily rule out the Ethio-Egyptian proxy conflict to come into play in Somalia.
Military civilian intels put forward Ethiopia’s traditionally well-established links to various Somali local administrators, particularly in Jubaland and South West provinces, who oppose the removal of Ethiopian troops and favor Addis Ababa’s security assistance, [34] clearing the way for an outbreak of an armed conflict fought between pro-Ethiopian proxies and Somali authorities.
The Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia Axis Formalized
The Asmara Summit that took place in the Eritrean capital in October this year cemented cooperation between Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia. [2] Having covered Egypt’s latest provocative assistance to Somalia, one should delve into individual reasons for parties to attend the Asmara summit to recognize the reasons behind the realization of an anti-Ethiopia pact. Egypt, the most significant party to the summit, is concerned about Ethiopia’s growing influence over the Nile and Horn regions, focusing principally on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which threatens Egypt’s water security. [25] However, for Eritrea, the circumstances are more complex, considering its intervention in the Tigray War that ended in a truce in 2022 [22] and its cultural and military links to ethnic groups in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. Somalia, in turn, is preoccupied with Ethiopia’s violation of its integrity and potential for future Ethiopian land grabs.
Nile waters have always been a national priority for Cairo. [12] Throughout the past century, Egypt sought to secure its role in the area crucial to sustaining its economy and providing for the population through a series of treaties with other Nile states, such as Sudan. [37] Later, these treaties were challenged by the “riparian states*” of the Nile, with the largest being Ethiopia, in the quest for an equal share of the river’s waters. [37] The greatest concern for Egypt is Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam project launched in 2011, which allowed the acquisition of a considerable amount of water from the Blue Nile, one of the two tributaries of the Great Nile.
* Riparian states, in the context of River Nike, refer to countries from which the tributaries of the Nile originate before flowing north, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda. [37] |
While Egypt diplomatically asserted its objection to the project for years, its ally Sudan, preoccupied with the potential jeopardization of the Nile waters similarly essential for its economy, looks at the reported potential benefits of the dam for its agricultural sector in the long run. [35] The dam’s high flood management capacity could facilitate irrigation in Sudan, thus allowing for large portions of cultivable land to be used for industrial purposes. [35] Given the unclear Grand Renaissance Dam’s effects on the Sudanese economy, Khartoum may appear less willing to participate in Egypt’s persistent pressure campaign on Addis Ababa to prevent the dam’s operation.
In addition, Cairo and Addis Ababa also part ways when it comes to their policies over the ongoing Sudanese Civil War. Cairo asserted its support to Sudan’s ruling officer, General Abdelfettah Al-Burhan [4], when the war ignited a year ago, while a personal link between Egypt’s president Al Sisi and Al Burhan, stemming from the fact that both came into power by coup d’etats, could be traced. In contrast, Ethiopia appears to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are currently battling government troops, as manifested in the RSF chief’s visit to Addis Ababa in December of the previous year. [6] Hence, aiming to reduce the influence of Ethiopia over the Nile Basin, Cairo reaches Eritrea, historically hurt by Addis Ababa’s actions.
Eritrea’s motives for rapprochement with Egypt and hosting the Tripartite Summit in its capital are also clear. After a thirty-year-long liberation war against Ethiopia resulting in the gaining independence of Eritrea in 1991, the countries have not succeeded in solving their disputes, engaging in a war from 1998 to 2000 with sizable fatalities on both sides. [26] While the historical animosity between the two, by default, draws Asmara closer to Ethiopia’s regional rivals, the current stalemate in Tigray peace progress further pushes Eritrea to seek support from Egypt. Eritrea’s persistent military presence in Ethiopia’s North Tigray region due to TPLF**’s partial failure to comply with disarmament and integration with the ENDF*** left Asmara pinned in Ethiopian affairs. [33] With diplomatic efforts between the two countries seeming futile and the military option put out of the table by the Pretoria Agreement that concluded the Tigray War, Asmara appears likely to keep its troops stationed in Ethiopia, thus halting the peace process. Therefore, joining Egypt’s block could provide Asmara with a means of covering its protracted operations in the area. If the tripartite Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu defense pact materializes, the Ethiopian attention, shifted towards Somalia, may grant Eritrea a new room to maneuver better in Tigray in pursuit of its national interests.
** The Tigray People’s Liberation Force, or TPLF, is an armed militia based in Ethiopia’s Tigray region that fought a bloody 2-year-long civil war known as the Tigray War from 2020 to 2022. *** Ethiopian National Defense Force, or ENDF, refers to the Ethiopian Armed Forces. |
Another rationale for Eritrea to strengthen its ties with Egypt is Asmara’s willingness to break its post-independence diplomatic isolation in the international arena, which was later solidified by the Ethiopian diplomatic campaign following the Eritrean war of 1998-2000. [19] Asmara owes this diplomatic setback partially to its oppressive regime, with the country having held no elections since its independence in 1991 and ruled by President Isaias Afwerki’s iron fist for more than three decades. [41] The second reason for isolation is the continuing border disputes with Ethiopia and the two countries’ disagreements on conciliation over ongoing civil strives in the Horn, such as the Tigray conflict. In the past decade, Eritrea’s international reputation has hit the bottom following Asmara’s smuggling of arms to the Al-Shabab militants operating in Somalia, leading to UNSC sanctions. [13] Isolation, having crippled the country’s economic and strategic potential, is now getting cracked with a rapprochement with Egypt and Somalia. Despite Eritrea’s previous openings to certain Gulf states, such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia [31], it has never reached a defense pact with one of the major powers until October of that year. Hence, the Asmara summit undermines Eritrea’s waning isolation and promises a greater role in the Horn of Africa affairs, guiding Asmara through a path of cooperation and mutual understanding with Egypt aimed at countering Ethiopian influence.
Last but not least, from Somalia’s standpoint, the Asmara summit and the defense agreement with Egypt and Eritrea appear pivotal for maintaining Mogadishu’s nominal grip over its autonomous and often rebellious provinces while anticipating direct military assistance. With its fragmented and unfunctional armed forces, direct military assistance, that is, the deployment of Egyptian contingents in Somalia, might facilitate the containment of the Al-Shabab insurgency [17] and the reversal of territorial gains made by the militant group in recent months. [21] Nonetheless, it must be noted that Egypt has no real interest in Somalia [36], particularly compared to Turkey, whose partnership with Somalia has been manifested in Mogadishu’s approval of the Turkish search for oil and gas fields off-coast Somalia. [42] For Egypt, it is more of a matter of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” approach, which suggests the greater benefits for Somalia to enter a defense cooperation with Egypt than the other way around.
Implications for the Future of the Horn of Africa
The Asmara summit marks the first formal defense cooperation agreement between Somalia, Eritrea, and the regional power Egypt, bearing anti-Ethiopian characteristics. The deal, which predicts direct Egyptian and Eritrean military assistance to Somalia, is likely to keep Ethiopia under check and discourage it from any bold actions in the future. Above all, the defense pact is aimed at deterring Ethiopian involvement in Somaliland and its potential attempts to establish a naval base within the leased territories of the Berbera port. Such an action would entail the permanent presence of the Ethiopian navy in the Red Sea in the vicinity of the Bab-El Mandeep strait. It is particularly prominent given the Ethiopian Defense Ministry’s announcement of the re-establishment of the country’s naval forces in January 2020 after the loss of coastline following Eritrean independence in 1991 [40], which signals its ambitions to regain the status of naval power.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Ethiopia intends to expand its navy to the Berbera port. The news from this summer indicates that the neighboring Djibouti is a host for the Ethiopian naval base [16] rather than Somaliland’s Berbera port, as was assumed. Despite Ethiopia’s acquisition of naval bases for military use in Djibouti, and presumably in Berbera, the country is hardly able to build a sufficient naval force to exert power over the Red Sea and Somali Basin in the short run. However, Ethiopia may get enough vessels, reinstating its maritime role in the surrounding waters, especially given the incapacity of either the Eritrean or Somali navy to counter Ethiopian aspirations in this field.
Another implication of the Asmara summit may lie in the emergent limitations to peacebuilding efforts in the Tigray and Amhara regions. The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, released an assessment in October [33] pointing out the material setbacks stemming from the continuous Eritrean military presence in the North Tigray region that will remain under Egyptian cover support. The Cairo-Asmara-Mogadishu alliance may utilize the Eritrean-occupied northern Tigray as leverage to contain Ethiopian actions in Somalia. In military terms, a scenario of clashes with the Ethiopian army in Somalia appears less likely given that the Ethiopian army needs to maintain its presence in northern Tigray amidst the lagging peace process. However, it is essential to recall the agreement’s defensive objectives since the defense deal will not necessarily encourage actions against Ethiopia. Accordingly, the enlargement of Eritrea’s occupation zone in North Tigray, which is supposed to disarm the TPLF units that remained largely mobilized following the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, would not be encouraged by the pact.
Finally, the Egypt-Eritrea-Somalia deal may motivate Ethiopia to pivot towards mediation with Mogadishu. Under insecurity, both in the north and the south, stemming from the current engagement with Eritrea and Egypt, Addis Ababa may adopt a more pragmatic approach towards its bilateral relations with Somalia. As the backbone issue, the Berbera port lease might be mitigated with an Ethiopian assurance to Mogadishu that the port deal will not come tied to the diplomatic recognition of the de facto independent Somaliland by Ethiopia. Moreover, Ethiopia might channel its concerns through third-party mediation, such as the shuttle diplomacy launched by Ankara [15] several months earlier to calm the winds in the Horn of Africa. In this fashion, Ethiopia could speak at a higher diplomatic level and pave the way for a mutual understanding of the issues of port access by Ethiopia and Somalia’s territorial integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to address Egypt’s direct role in the latter and how to avoid a military standoff with Ethiopia along the Somali border. The best outcome would be a joint effort by the Ethiopian and Egyptian authorities to give consent to build a self-capable Somali army and a smooth takeover of the AU mission in Somalia by Egypt, accompanied by a peaceful retreat of Ethiopian units from Somali territory. A self-reliant Somali military will prove beneficial to both the Egyptian and Ethiopian security needs.
Furthermore, the third-party mediation of the Somali-Ethiopia dispute might have bound both parties to refrain from escalatory actions. Nations involved in the Somali-Ethiopian mediation process, such as Turkey, have substantial investments in state-building initiatives in the region, while other third-party mediators, including Uganda and Kenya [5], express significant concerns regarding military escalation and its detrimental effects on counterterrorism efforts against Al-Shabab. There is substantial evidence to suggest that mediators contribute to the de-escalation of tensions in the Horn of Africa, as a dangerous escalation would potentially trigger a series of undesirable consequences, not only at the regional level but also on a global scale.
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