ABSTRACT
Today's international relations discussions center on China's increasing influence and shifting power balance. With the U.S. losing its position as the sole superpower, rivalry intensifies and global affairs are reshaped. Saudi Arabia, an energy superpower in the strategic Middle East that has the potential to lead the Muslim world, has been significantly impacted.
Over the past decade, Sino-Saudi relations have strengthened remarkably. Xi Jinping's attendance at the "Three Summits" in Saudi Arabia in December 2022 marked a diplomatic milestone [9], followed by China brokering Saudi-Iran normalization, highlighting Beijing’s growing influence in the region. Saudi Arabia's engagement with organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS underscores its diversification of partnerships and efforts to expand its geopolitical reach beyond traditional Western alliances. Given the U.S.'s longstanding role as Saudi Arabia's primary security, economic, and diplomatic partner, the growing China-Saudi relationship warrants closer examination to assess the impact of China's rise in these areas.
This essay seeks to address the research question: ‘How do the different aspects of Saudi Arabia's relationships with China and the United States influence its strategy for balancing the shifting global power dynamics?’. The logic of the essay lies in evaluating the different dimensions of Riyadh's relations with Beijing and Washington and determining how the texture of these relationships shapes the Kingdom's strategic positioning.

Going Toward Intertwining
To analyze the direction of relations between the two nations, it is crucial to understand how each party views the other. In Saudi Arabia, China is generally seen as a hub of potential, particularly in terms of economic ties. China is not only a major market for Saudi oil but also a leader in technology. In recent years, Saudi leaders have clearly expressed their desire to diversify the economy, with technology playing a central role in these plans, as seen in initiatives like "Vision 2030" and the futuristic city of "NEOM" [12]. On the other hand, Chinese consideration of relations with Arabia is more nuanced. The Middle East is a key region that China views as having significant strategic importance. The “Belt and Road Initiative” and “Digital Silk Road” are among the mega-projects that China can change the face of the Middle East.
Economic Ties: The Backbone of Relations
Economic relations are the primary forces behind the strengthening of ties between Riyadh and Beijing. Saudi Arabia's main export is oil, and China, as the world's largest oil consumer, has immense thirst for it. This mutual alignment between supply and demand makes the two countries strong economic partners. The IMF recently highlighted that China is now Saudi Arabia’s largest oil buyer, accounting for over a quarter of its oil exports [5]. Moreover, China is also the top market for non-oil products in Saudi Arabia. Another driver of stronger ties in economic relations is the Kingdom’s objective to draw foreign investment and transform its economy by diversifying beyond the traditional energy sector. Expanding local industries is a key component of Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, which aims to end the Kingdom’s dependence on what he calls its “addiction to oil.” In this context, the Saudi government is looking for China to emerge as a significant investor in the Kingdom’s economy. Saudi Arabia is the foremost beneficiary of Chinese regional contracts and investments. Since 2005, China has entered into significant investment agreements and construction contracts in Saudi Arabia, totaling nearly $60 billion, more than any other country in the Middle East and North Africa [2].
Saudi Arabia's significant economic reliance on China is evident in its trade volume, totaling $106 billion by 2022 [3]. Notably, there is another fact behind the curtail: the Saudi economic trajectory from west to east. About two decades ago, trade between Saudi Arabia and China was only about 10% of the Kingdom’s total trade with the EU and U.S [8]. However, by 2011, China surpassed the U.S. in trade volume with Saudi Arabia, and by 2018, it exceeded Saudi Arabia’s trade volume with the entire EU [8]. Today, China is Saudi Arabia’s top trading partner, surpassing combined trade volumes with Western nations [8]. Figure 1 shows that by 2024, the Kingdom's total imports from China are almost triple those of the United States [11]. One reason for the economic independence between Riyadh and Washington was the shale revolution in the 2000s; since then, the United States has become much less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and is now itself the world's first producer. It is worth mentioning that Saudi leaders appear to have a clear perception of the global shift in balance of power and their economic reliance on China; Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih in an interview with CNBC stated, “This is, in a way, a multipolar global order that has emerged— it’s not emerging. China is a significant player in it.” [10].

Developing a Strategic Dimension in Political Ties
For political relations, it is better to delve into each nation’s political aims and approaches. China's involvement in the Middle East is primarily through economic engagement. It focuses on strengthening geopolitical influence by forming strategic partnerships centered on economic ties, including trade, investment, energy, and technology. Unlike traditional alliances that require defense commitment, China's partnerships are based on mutual interests across various sectors. This strategy prioritizes economic goals, regional influence, and trade dependencies. Saudi Arabia is particularly important to China because of its crucial role in energy security as a top oil supplier and its influence in the Middle East. In December 2022, a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement was signed between China and the Kingdom.
From Saudi Arabia’s political perspective, China presents not only a significant economic partner, but also an opportunity, as its rising power as a superpower demands closer political ties. This recognition has been further shaped by two key international developments: first, the strengthening of ties between China and Iran, a long-term rival of Saudi Arabia, and second, the recent distancing of the United States from the Kingdom in several instances. Saudi leadership is particularly desperate by the U.S. response to the Yemen War, the Khashoggi scandal, and the 2019 Aramco drone attack. Washington was also unhappy with Saudi Arabia's collaboration with Russia in OPEC+ and its alignment with China, Russia, and Iran, especially its involvement with BRICS (though not officially a member). Despite these cooler ties, Saudi Arabia has not completely distanced itself from the U.S., which retains significant leverage over the country. The U.S. is working to limit Saudi-China ties, seeking assurances that Saudi Arabia will not allow China to build military bases in its territory, reduce Huawei's presence, and discourage oil transactions in yuan instead of the U.S. dollar.
Military Partnerships are the Achille’s heel of the Relations
Military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and China remains minimal, with China accounting for only 1-2% of Saudi arms imports over the past decade [4]. The challenge of integrating Chinese weapons into the existing Western system of Saudi Arabia makes it difficult for China to play a significant role in Saudi defense. On the other hand, around 61% of arms imports between 2013 and 2017 were from the United States, with the remainder coming from U.S. allies (Figure 2) (SIPRI, 2018). This long-standing relationship makes a shift away from the U.S. to an adversary unlikely.
![Figure 2: Saudi Arabia's arms import by country, 2013–2017 [7]](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/45eab8_36792accfc744094a1ca74ba407610bf~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_421,h_284,al_c,q_85,enc_auto/45eab8_36792accfc744094a1ca74ba407610bf~mv2.png)
Saudi-Chinese-American Geopolitical Triangle
Since the official announcement of Vision 2030 by Prince Mohammed bin Salman in April 2016, which aimed to diversify Saudi Arabia's economy, reduce its reliance on oil, and enhance sectors such as tourism and healthcare, it is clear that the kingdom’s focus has shifted toward internal development. Riyadh is actively seeking favorable conditions to achieve these ambitious goals. In this regard, China’s growing plans and capabilities align closely with Saudi objectives, further strengthened by robust economic ties between the two nations. Moreover, Saudis have been looking at multiple alliances and ensuring that they hedge their bets.
While Saudi-China ties enable strong economic collaboration, their weaker security relations, with no near-term prospects for improvement, remain Washington's key leverage. The U.S. has sought to exploit this advantage for strategic purposes. The Saudi Arabia and United States are negotiating a comprehensive "Defense Treaty," similar to the security pact between the U.S. and Japan. Washington's objectives included containing Iran, establishing a new security framework in the Middle East, and limiting China's influence in the region. If the treaty succeeds, it could significantly impact Saudi-China relations, especially in technology and strategic alignments, and even economic ties strained as China might view Riyadh as less reliable. It is notable that the U.S. may show some flexibility regarding stronger Sino-Arabian ties. This is because if China perceives significant American influence in the Kingdom, it could prompt a closer alliance between Iran and China to counterbalance U.S. leverage in the Middle East, a scenario the U.S. seeks to avoid.
Saudi Dual Strategy
As a result of evaluating its dependence on both major powers, Riyadh pursued a dual strategy. Saudi Arabia is carefully managing its global relationships by seeking defense support from the United States, while ensuring that this does not harm its expanding economic ties with China. This approach helps Riyadh maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, gaining advantage from relationships with both Western and Eastern nations without making binding commitments.
However, the worsening relations between the U.S. and China make this equilibrium more challenging. For example, Nvidia, a leader in advanced computer chips, announced restrictions on exporting its top chips to "some Middle Eastern countries" [6]. This is seen as part of the U.S.–China Chip War, directly influencing Saudi Arabia's technological cooperation strategies.
Conclusion
The Saudi dilemma stems from the fact that neither superpower can fully substitute for another, as the nature of its relationship with each is fundamentally different. China is the best choice for economic ties, while the United States is crucial for security matters. Saudi Arabia’s effort is to maintain balanced and delicate relations with the two global powerhouses to achieve its internal goals. As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal said, ‘We do not believe in polarization or choosing between one partner and another… The Kingdom’s economy is rapidly growing, and we need all partners’ [1]. Whether the kingdom can manage to sustain these balanced ties in the coming years is uncertain; however, with increasing conflict between China and the U.S., maintaining balanced relations will become extremely difficult for leaders in Riyadh. However, it is certain that each superpower attempts to grab the Saudis by its relational competitive advantage, which is butter for China and gun for the U.S..
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