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Federico Campagnolo

Russia’s Africa Strategy: A New Opportunity For The Continent?

Updated: Nov 23


ABSTRACT


Since the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation has had to reposition itself both economically and diplomatically, as relations with the West hit rock bottom. Putin has been working to strengthen his country’s already existing relationships, particularly with China[19], Iran[31], and North Korea[35], to counter the harsh sanctions that have been rolled out against the Federation from 2014 onwards[10]. However, Russia’s major diplomatic work since then has been the establishment of partnerships in Africa[2]. It is therefore important to understand Moscow’s playbook in the continent to state whether or not it results in positive outcomes for the countries involved.

 

 

HISTORICAL CONTEXT


The Russian Federation’s presence in Africa is a relatively modern development in international relations and geopolitics, as it primarily started after their annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, but Russians have had a history of activity in the continent. A brief first attempt at colonialism by the Russian Empire was made when, in January 1889, adventurer Nikolai Ivanovich Ashinov took over an abandoned Egyptian port in Sagallo, a village in the Tadjoura region of modern-day Djibouti, and naming it “New Moscow”[22]. Such a venture came to a swift end, as, on the 5th of February of the same year, French warships gave Ashinov an ultimatum to surrender and leave their colonial territory, a condition which was accepted after the ships opened fire for fifteen minutes[22]. When Ashinov’s mission began creating tensions with the French, Tsar Alexander III disavowed it, calling it “a sad and stupid comedy”[22]. Africa remained of little interest to the Russians after this failure, and it remained as such until the mid-1950s, when the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev, returned to the continent during its period of decolonization. The Soviets first attempted to shape newly independent and developing countries in West Africa by exporting the socialist socio-economic model which “transformed the USSR [...] into a modern, industrial society”, with the goal of expanding their sphere of influence to those countries that opposed Western Imperialism[16]. This experiment was extremely costly to the Soviets, both economically and in terms of capabilities to oppose Western intervention. By the end of 1964, with Khrushchev being ousted, the “Africa policy” changed to one more akin to that of the West, one of active military presence, in their case by supporting “national liberation movements” and Marxist sympathizing leaders through arms supplies. This became the standard approach for the USSR when it got majorly involved in the continent about a decade later[16]. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the new Russian Federation could not afford to remain in Africa, and temporarily withdrew, until the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and later the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led the country to economic and diplomatic isolation[34].

 

President Vladimir Putin shaking hands with Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera during St. Petersburg Summit in 2023 [Handout photo/EPA/EFE]

 



A RESURGENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY


To address this new reality, the Kremlin sought to restore and enhance its previous presence in Africa, adopting a complex strategy to pursue military, economic, and diplomatic interests[12]. This new approach is multifaceted, and relies heavily on Russia riding the wave of recent anti-colonial sentiment into becoming a central representative of the interests of the “global majority”[38], that is, the Global South. Russia’s “lack” of a colonial history helps in this regard, as it can present itself as a valid alternative to the imperial West in regards to economic growth and security. Many countries in Africa are recipients of Moscow’s Grain Deal[1], security cooperation initiatives[32], and investments in the fields of energy[3] and mineral refinement[7], all of which attempt to meet the wide-ranging interests of the various actors in the continent[28]. The Western sanctions also forced Russia to look for alternative customers willing to buy their extensive supply of fossil fuels, albeit at lower costs. Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia quickly raised their imports, leading to a 1170%increase in African imports of Russian oil products, from 33000 barrels per day to over 420000[15]. Moreover, Russia has a prominent role in arms sales[39] in Africa, as the former Soviet policy in the continent rendered the use of their equipment widespread, particularly in Algeria, Angola, and Ethiopia[13]. Close cooperation of this kind is also reflected in greater support at the UN, where Russia, after their Ukraine invasion in 2022, is seeking friends, or, at least, neutral stances, from the African countries, which make up the largest voting bloc in the Organization[33]. In this sense, Russia is a valid alternative to Western actors, who are tainted by a history of exploitation of the continent: the Kremlin finds new allies in the UN to substitute the Western markets with, while investing in their development and broadening their trade opportunities, and countries in Africa stand to gain from such investments and security guarantees without much of the exploitation. For some countries, such as Mali[44], Niger[11], and Burkina Faso[21], it is natural to be receptive to Russian offers, as Russia remains the “only” powerful international partner available due to sanctions coming from both their former ECOWAS partners and the West.

 

 

A CRITIQUE OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITY


Critics instead argue that this new decolonization movement is really “being driven by opportunistic illiberal regimes” that adopt anticolonial rhetoric as a front to push an agenda[43], and possibly being a part of a Russian strategy to return to global power status[36]. Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with 43 countries in Africa (as of 2023), with Sudan being the primary candidate for the establishment of a military base[4], hence a logistical center. In countries where instability is high, such as Sudan, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic, authoritarianism has settled after a series of coups[20], and such holds on power have only been solidified through the presence first of the Russian-based Wagner Group, then of the Africa Corps. The Wagner Group was an entity founded by Dmitri Utkin in 2010[26] and composed of business, information (or rather, disinformation) and military elements all formerly owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin[6], who functioned as the link to the Kremlin, essentially rendering it a government proxy. Their activities varied following the needs of their customers, ranging from fighting rebels and Islamists, training troops, guarding resources, suppressing dissent, or running disinformation campaigns[30]. Being a “mercenary group”, Wagner’s operations, when compared to ones such as France’s Operation Barkhane, lack the link to their respective governments[25]. The Wagner Group was able to represent Russian interests in the regions they operated in without direct government involvement: their operations were de facto directed by Moscow, while de iure being made independently, as private military companies are technically illegal under Russian law[14]. The group’s operations in Africa appear to have started in 2017[6], when the Wagner Group was hired by the then President of Sudan Omar al Bashir to train the Sudanese military in exchange for concessions for gold mining[42]. The same year Wagner began operating in the Central African Republic as military instructors and to facilitate arms shipments to circumvent an UN weapons embargo on the country, all in exchange for gold and diamond mining concessions[9]. From then on, the Wagner Group’s reach extended to other areas of the continent, such as in Libya, where, in 2019, they actively fought in the Civil War in support of General Khalifa Haftar[24], then later in Mali[17], Niger[23], and Burkina Faso[40]. The death of Prigozhin in 2023 led to the dismantling of his empire, with the singular elements being “placed under the supervision of formal military and intelligence structures”, together with the incorporation of the remaining Wagner troops in Africa into the newly created Africa Corps under the control of the Russian Defense Ministry[6]. This rebranded group works analogously to Wagner, offering services in exchange for mining concessions. Beyond the countries in which the Africa Corps operates, Russia and its companies signed mining deals elsewhere: aluminum mining company Rusal signed a deal in Guinea, the nuclear energy group Rosatom mines uranium in Namibia[18], and diamond mining giant Alrosa tried to expand its operations in Zimbabwe and Angola[37]. Despite such significant deals, data on the aggregate African economy suggests that Russia’s economic involvement in the continent outside investments in energy and mining is remarkably low: it occupies a mere 2.4% of the total market share, gains $12.4 billion in exports, six times what it imports[8], and holds a place outside the top 10 countries for Foreign Direct Investment, with less than $15 billion[41] (2020 data). This suggests that Moscow’s strategy is one of low costs, focusing on strategic investments, exports of fossil fuels, arms, and grains, and careful deployment of its Africa Corps to secure resources, and high impact, generating political goodwill and fuelling otherwise legitimate anti-colonial and anti-western sentiment through disinformation campaigns[12], which create greater wedges between Western and African societies, pulling the latter into their sphere of influence.

 

 

CONCLUSION


Ultimately, whether or not this results in positive outcomes for countries in Africa depends on the type of analysis. From a purely materialist perspective, Russian imports are cheap, plentiful, and critical,  investments are relatively few, but crucial, as the fields of mineral refinement and energy can leverage industrial development. Security cooperation can also lead to greater stability in the continent, as Moscow can arbitrate tense inter-state relations, such as between Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia[29], while the Africa Corps can cooperate with national armies to thwart Rebel or Jihadist Groups. A more liberal analysis instead would focus on the repercussions Russia’s support of authoritarian regimes has on the fragile civil society slowly building in the continent, as human rights violations continue[27] while repression, reprisal, and imprisonments return as common practice against dissent[5]. Overall, Russia’s offers in investment, trade and security result much more appealing for Africa because they are cheaper than the West’s, and because there is no shared colonial history with its competitors. Moreover, the Kremlin does not make administrative demands to those who are involved with them, hence distancing itself from the Western Neocolonial-esque presumptions of democratic expansion. If the West wishes to regain its footing in the continent, it needs to seriously compete with Russia, offering better counter-offers while respecting the interests of the long-exploited countries of Africa.


 

 

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