Bending in the storm: introducing Vietnam's bamboo diplomacy

ABSTRACT

The Latin maxim Ubi maior minor cessat, in other words, "where there is the greater, the lesser ceases," is a concept that could be applied to many different contexts, including, at first glance, today's geopolitical setting. It may seem that the strongest actors within the international landscape are the sole rule makers; however, smaller and less influential countries retain the ability to play along these dynamics by acting in pursuit of their own interests and changing the overall balance. Among these smaller nations, Vietnam understood that its strategic position in the context of the Cold War had helped it become an appealing ally for its strong neighbors and overseas powers. Today, as a leading ASEAN nation, Vietnam has navigated complex diplomatic settings, upholding moderate relations with both NATO countries and former comrades. Scholars refer to this strategic management of foreign policy as the Bamboo policy.

Introduction

Vietnam’s access to the South China Sea, growing economy, and rising productivity have led to its ongoing development being closely monitored by powerful nations. In particular, it drew the attention of a long-term partner, China, and the world’s largest economy, the United States. Given the historical imbalance of power that characterized the relationship between Vietnam and China, Hanoi sought to establish stable connections with countries beyond Beijing, especially in the West, to prevent the recurrence of Chinese dominance over it. The strategic management of political and economic ties with various nations has earned Vietnam’s foreign policy approach a distinct label of Bamboo diplomacy. By leveraging the economic and security benefits of collaborating with different superpowers, Vietnam’s foreign policy has consequently focused on diversifying its network with other nations, thereby adapting to the shifting global dynamics. This approach was formalized decades ago after Doi Moi₁, in Party’s Resolution No.13, adopted in May 1988 and entitled “On the Tasks and Foreign Policy in the New Situation.” The document sought to promote economic growth and deeper engagement in a multi-directional foreign policy through two main strategies: Da Dang Hoa and Da Phuong Hoa – “diversification” and “multilateralism.” These strategies aimed to put an end to the trade embargo and secure Vietnam’s membership in major international organizations, modifying the rigid “anti-Western” stance of the country. [1, 15] This article analyzes the relationship between Vietnam and its most powerful partners, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, and investigates the affinity between Hanoi and Moscow, which remained closely tied to Vietnam even after the collapse of the USSR.

History of Vietnam’s relationship with China

To understand the historical and political proximity between China and Vietnam, we must dive into the ancient history of both countries, tracing back to the 2nd century BC. During this time, the Qin Empire invaded the territories of present-day southern China and northern Vietnam, which was later completed by Han emperor Han Wudi in 111 BC. This conquest marked the beginning of a period best known in Vietnam as Bắc thuộc, or “Belonging to the North.” During that period, a succession of Chinese empires dominated Vietnam’s ancient kingdoms, relegating them to tributary status for nearly a thousand years [4].

After the Opium Wars in the 19^th century, China lost control over its neighboring subject territories, which were rapidly seized by European powers. Its interference in Vietnam was renewed during the war for independence against France, and the support of the Communist Party of China (CPC/CCP) persisted throughout Hanoi’s campaign against Southern Vietnam, which was backed by the United States’ military. When Vietnam intervened in Cambodia, China rushed to halt its expansion, militarily intervening against the forces of Hanoi from February to March 1979. This gesture, largely symbolic, discouraged Vietnam from asserting regional leadership. However, following the consolidation of its regime in the 1980s, Vietnam normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing, which is now regarded as Vietnam’s principal trading partner. [1,2]

Current relationship with PRC

Vietnam’s relationship with China is defined by a delicate balance of trading partnership and mutual political support, and limiting Chinese influence in the South China Sea. China exerts its influence over several Southeast Asian countries through investment projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which finances important infrastructural projects in the region. Notable examples include the recently launched China-Laos railway, which connects Vientiane to Kunming and the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway. This system has garnered a favorable reception from the PRC across much of the area. However, the assets brought by Beijing cannot extinguish the overbearing presence that China displays in these countries. During the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, China once again demonstrated its determination to exert its influence in Southeast Asia when former General Secretary of the PRC Deng Xiaoping carried out containment measures for Vietnam’s expansion goals in Cambodia. However, as previously mentioned, formal diplomatic relations were soon reestablished.

The bond between the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the CPC is deeply rooted in their similar governing model, referencing Marxist-Leninist ideology and the legacies of national heroes such as Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The CPV has learned from both Soviet and Maoist examples to strengthen its regime, implementing five-year plans and party-building strategies to preserve its political monopoly. Today, it remains one of the few ruling communist parties in the world operating under the shadow of Beijing’s leadership. [2, 14].

Reinforcing the evident imbalance of power, Hanoi has displayed symbolic fondness for its comrade, similar to its subordinate position during the tributary period when Vietnam formally acknowledged the Chinese Empire as its superior. The shadow of this historical system is carried out through the CPV’s recognition of Chinese engagement in East and Southeast Asia, which makes the PRC an ever-present actor in the area. The shared future perspective of Beijing and Hanoi, initially championed by former Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong, is now being carried by his successor, President To Lam. Upon his election, President To Lam chose China as his first official visit, thereby breaking the tradition of visiting Laos first after the Party Congress—a precedent already set by former Secretary Trong in 2021–following his re-election [7, 13].

Apart from exerting a firm political influence, China stands as Vietnam’s primary trading partner. The China-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership is regarded as the “highest hierarchy in Vietnam’s diplomatic relations,” thereby making Beijing Hanoi’s main concern in its foreign strategy [8]. The economic relationship between China and Vietnam is so robust that some Chinese companies relocate their manufacturing sites to Vietnam to circumvent potential increases in tariffs on their products. Among the companies that have adopted these strategies, the most notable case is Gore-Tex’s relocation of production sites. Gore-Tex, the official supplier for Apple’s AirPods, moved its factories to Vietnam to avoid disruptions in production caused by the Sino-American trade war [5]. Although Vietnam can clearly benefit from these circumstances, relying exclusively on China can compromise its national sovereignty. Cautious of overdependence, Vietnam has sought valid alternatives in the Western market, particularly through its partnership with the United States, to balance its relationship with Beijing.

Vietnam’s relationship with the US after the Cold War

Vietnam’s understandable fear of a disproportionate Chinese intervention in the area has redirected Vietnamese citizens’ skepticism from Washington toward Beijing. Vietnam’s strategic management of trading agreements with Western countries provides Hanoi the opportunity to extricate itself from China’s orbit. Despite engagement with Vietnam representing one of the darkest chapters in recent US military history, the two countries, tied by the urge to contain Chinese political and economic expansion in Southeast Asia, have spent the past 30 years working toward financial cooperation. Most Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, have recently expressed concern about a potential increase in Chinese influence in the area, an outcome that paints Beijing as a greater threat than Washington. The PRC’s attitude is undeniably encouraging Vietnam and ASEAN members to seek potential alternatives to Beijing, actively shaping their foreign strategy. To what extent can China and the United States influence the socioeconomic setting of this region?

A 2019 survey conducted by the Yusof Ishak Institute on general geopolitical and socio-economic issues in Southeast Asia revealed that both China and the United States exert greater political influence over ASEAN member states than the ASEAN organization itself, thereby making the Sino-American trade war a significant concern for many countries in the region. Most Vietnamese respondents expressed greater trust in the United States than in China, considering Washington to be more reliable in contributing to global peace and security. When asked, ‘How confident are you of the US as a strategic partner and provider of regional security?’, over 50% of Vietnamese respondents answered positively, while respondents from other member states were slightly more uncertain. When posed the question “How do you view China’s re-emergence as a major power with respect to Southeast Asia?” Vietnamese and Filipino respondents were the only groups in which more than 60% selected the most pessimistic option: fear that China might become a revisionist power and bring the entire Southeast Asian region under its influence. [8, 11].

Vietnam appears to regard the United States with relatively limited apprehension. This new cooperation between the United States and the Vietnamese government bloomed after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995, driven not only by robust reinforcement of bilateral trade agreements but also by the aforementioned mutual mistrust of Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia [1]. Vietnam’s recent development plans have bolstered commercial ties with the US by enabling American companies to invest in a developing country that, unlike China, which has rapidly emerged as an economic rival of Washington, does not raise concerns. The most notable accomplishments in the formal partnership between Hanoi and Washington included the Trade and Investment Agreement signed by the parties in 2007, and the US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, signed in 2013 and celebrated with a visit of former US President Joe Biden to Hanoi in 2023. In 2024, Vietnam’s export revenue to the US was estimated to exceed 110 billion dollars, positioning Washington as Vietnam’s second-largest trade partner and largest export destination [9]. Due to rising labor costs in China and the ongoing trade war with the US, some American companies have relocated their production sites to Vietnam. For example, Nike did so in 2009 because production costs were half as much as in China [3].

A never-ending affinity: Vietnam-Russia relations

Unlike the interest-driven dynamics that characterize present-day Vietnam’s relations with China and the United States, the partnership between Hanoi and Moscow is firmly grounded in a longstanding friendship rooted in the historical bond between the USSR and Northern Vietnam.

While having a less looming presence than the PRC and the US, Russia retains a secure strategic partnership with Vietnam. The solid diplomatic relations between Moscow and Hanoi are the outcome of a long-lasting amity, which started on account of the military and economic support the USSR provided to Vietnam before and during its civil war. Following the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West due to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Russia pursued a pragmatic “Pivot to Asia.” With its territory extending mainly in northern and central Asia and being particularly close to China, it is reasonable for the Russian Federation to expand its foreign policy agenda toward the East. This approach has been supported, mainly rhetorically, since President Putin’s third mandate started in 2012.

Given these circumstances, the necessity to “rebalance to the West” has consequently led Russia to explore different possibilities, maintaining a focus on its relationships with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, China, and Vietnam. In President Putin’s May 2012 decree, published after his re-election, the Asia-Pacific region was designated as the third priority in Russia's foreign policy since Europe and former USSR members still held significant relevance. After the 2022 escalation in Ukraine, Moscow’s strategy of rebalancing to the West did not find a definitive solution in Southeast Asia, where Russia had relatively little influence compared to other superpowers. Other than exporting wheat and seed oil, Russia has been the primary weapon supplier in the region for the first two decades of the century, surpassing the US’s military exports by nearly 3 billion USD. One particular area in which Moscow performs better than Washington and Beijing is the relatively benign image of the country in the eyes of Southeast Asian citizens, who generally do not perceive Russia as a threat to their independence and sovereignty.

Vietnam remains the only country in Southeast Asia that has a comprehensive strategic partnership with Moscow. This affinity is largely attributed to the Soviet Union’s influence on the formation of modern Vietnam, serving as the clearest example of memory diplomacy, an approach employed by Moscow to leverage the historical ties and military alliances formed during the USSR era. This strategy aims to sustain and cultivate relationships with countries that have benefited from Moscow's support, such as Hanoi. [10, 12].

Given the solid partnership, Moscow’s investments in Vietnam are not limited to military equipment, and Russia is also working to expand its energy exports in the region. This effort is manifested in an agreement between the two countries, which outlines a cooperative plan for developing nuclear power plants in Vietnam. With the assistance of Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation (ROSATOM), both parties are currently collaborating to establish nuclear technology facilities in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Russian company RusHydro is planning to develop and expand the capacity of hydroelectric projects in Vietnam’s waters [16]. 

The central premise of this paragraph is that, while Vietnam seeks to navigate its foreign policy to benefit from the Sino-American trade war, its relationship with Russia is less influenced by concerns over potential invasions or coercive strategies from Moscow. Instead, it focuses on Russia’s need to maintain a positive image of Asia and Vietnam’s appreciation of a less intimidating strategic partner. This is upheld not only by the Vietnamese government but also by its citizens; a survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2017 showed that 83% of Vietnamese had a favorable opinion of the Russian government [6]. Russia’s positive relationship with Vietnam is also attributed to Hanoi being one of the few countries that has maintained solid ties with Moscow following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Vietnam abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions regarding the issue, while its government officials and experts refrained from criticizing Russia’s policies.

Conclusion

Three decades after normalizing political relations with the United States and joining ASEAN, Vietnam's efforts to expand its foreign policy have borne fruit. The country has successfully strengthened its military agreements with longstanding allies and secured trade partnerships with former adversaries. These achievements have resulted in a well-balanced foreign policy and robust security framework for Vietnam. Although Vietnam is unlikely to disrupt its commercial ties with China, cultivating strategic alternatives serves as an investment in national security and sovereignty. Although the Russian Federation does not possess the same level of economic and political influence as the PRC and the US, it remains one of Vietnam’s closest partners because of its historical bonds and shared interests, particularly in Russian investments in Southeast Asia.

Does Russia attempt to enhance its influence by following China’s BRI model? While investment and construction strategies may suggest a certain trajectory, the question remains whether Russia is currently stable and powerful enough to prioritize the development of potential allies over its own. Data suggest that although Russia is likely to remain a close ally to Vietnam, today, only China and the United States possess sufficient influence in Southeast Asia to effectively condition Vietnam’s subsequent strategies. As for China and the United States, which power is more likely to consolidate its influence in Vietnam and Southeast Asia? Will China continue to rely on investment projects to build goodwill among ASEAN member states or will the United States succeed in leveraging regional concerns over China's assertiveness in the South China Sea?

Vietnam's Bamboo Policy has thus far enabled the country to effectively capitalize on regional tensions in Southeast Asia, most notably, the Sino-American trade war. However, how long can this strategy maintain a diplomatic balance? Should the winds begin to blow too strongly from both East and the West, in which direction will the bamboo choose to bend?

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